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Abstract The goal of Seguro Popular (SP) in Mexico was
to improve the financial protection of the uninsured pop-
ulation against excessive health expenditures. This paper
estimates the impact of SP on catastrophic health expen-
ditures (CHE), as well as out-of-pocket (OOP) health
expenditures, from two different sources. First, we use the
SP Impact Evaluation Survey (2005–2006), and compare
the instrumental variables (IV) results with the experi-
mental benchmark. Then, we use the same IV methods
with the National Health and Nutrition Survey (ENSANUT
2006). We estimate naı¨ve models, assuming exogeneity,
and contrast them with IV models that take advantage of
the specific SP implementation mechanisms for identifi-
cation. The IV models estimated included two-stage least
squares (2SLS), bivariate probit, and two-stage residual
inclusion (2SRI) models. Instrumental variables estimates
resulted in comparable estimates against the ‘‘gold stan-
dard.’’ Instrumental variables estimates indicate a reduction
of 54% in catastrophic expenditures at the national level.
SP beneficiaries also had lower expenditures on outpatient
and medicine expenditures. The selection-corrected pro-
tective effect is found not only in the limited experimental
dataset, but also at the national level.
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Introduction
This paper aims to estimate the treatment effect of health
insurance targeted to the poorest families on catastrophic
health expenditures (CHE) and out-of-pocket (OOP) health
spending in Mexico. It draws on previous observational
analyses of the issues surrounding health expenditure in
Mexico [1–5], but adds a new dimension in the literature
by using selection-correction methods for the potentially
endogenous treatment variable. The goals of the paper are
twofold. First, we compare instrumental variables (IV)
results with the ‘‘gold standard’’ experimental evidence [6]
in a limited dataset. Second, after that validation exercise,
we use the IV method with a nationally representative
database to explore if the protective effect found in the
experiment can be extrapolated to the entire nation. The
results suggest that Seguro Popular (SP) has a protective
effect on CHE and OOP spending not only in the experi-
mental (mostly rural) areas, but in the country as a whole.
The results presented here are relevant in the Mexican
context, but may be of interest beyond the local context.
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The issue of the impact of universal health insurance on
financial protection is of wide relevance across Latin
America and other regions with low- and middle-income
countries where the poor are disproportionately affected by
excessive expenditure on health care.
The paper proceeds as follows. In ‘‘Background’’ we
present a brief background of the SP program in Mexico.
‘‘Data and sample selection’’ presents the data and the
sample selection methods, followed by ‘‘Methods’’ with the
econometric methods used for the estimation of different
models. ‘‘Results’’ shows the results of the paper, followed
by a discussion in ‘‘Discussion’’. Finally, in the last section
the paper offers some ‘‘Limitations and conclusions’’.
Background
Seguro Popular (SP, or ‘‘Popular Health Insurance’’) was
implemented in Mexico as a comprehensive health reform
effort to provide financial protection in health for the
poorest segment of the population [7]. Until 2001, health
insurance coverage in Mexico was directed only to
employees working in the formal sector of the economy.
Coverage for formal sector workers included the Mexican
Social Insurance System (Instituto Mexicano del Seguro
Social, or IMSS), the Government Workers’ Social Secu-
rity and Services Institute (Instituto de Seguridad y Servi-
cios Sociales de los Trabajadores del Estado, or ISSSTE),
as well as insurance programs for employees of such state-
run enterprises as PEMEX (state oil company) and
SEDENA (Ministry of National Defense).
Participants in the informal sector of the economy, as
well as the self-employed, had to attend government-
sponsored facilities through the Ministry of Health
(Secretarı´a de Salud, or SSA) or pay OOP for medical care
at private health services. By 2002, there was evidence of
excessive health-related spending for the poorest rural
families in Mexico, particularly for the care of older adults
(over 60 years of age) and for care during pregnancy [5, 8,
9]. Most catastrophic expenditures among the poor were
attributed to outpatient care and medication. This situation
is common among the poorest segments of the population
in most developing countries where ‘‘a relatively small
payment can mean financial catastrophe to a poor person or
household, forcing them to reduce other basic expenses
such as food, shelter, or their children’s education’’ [10], or
even suffer financial catastrophe [11].
Health insurance for protecting against financial
catastrophe
From the earliest formal treatment on the subject, eco-
nomic theory has emphasized that health insurance is
demanded because it lessens financial risk against health
payments for an unexpected illness [12, 13]. The response
is based on expected utility theory and the assumption that
health insurance is desirable because of individual’s risk-
aversion. Hence, Pauly [14] underlines the concept that a
condition of purchasing an insurance is that the risk-aver-
sion benefit must exceed both the payload and the moral
hazard loss. However, benefits are also derived from the
insurance’s ability to make available medical care that
would not otherwise be affordable. In other words, health
insurance coverage would be the only way to gain access to
costly health care [15].
The high degree of OOP spending, as well as evidence
for the catastrophic health expenditure concentrated in poor
and uninsured households in Mexico by 2001, motivated the
implementation of a system of social protection in health
[7]. The main objective was to financially cover access to
health services and inputs for uninsured poor families. The
mechanism used to reach this goal was a public, voluntary
scheme that targeted primarily poor families without any
other publicly funded health insurance.
A major problem in Latin America, and other regions with
low- and middle-income countries, is the high percentage of
households that must incur OOP expenditure. This form of
financing frequently involves catastrophic health expendi-
ture particularly among households living in poverty [16]. A
multi-country analysis has shown that a group of countries in
Latin America have high rates of catastrophic health
expenditure [17], confirming the lack of financial protection,
particularly among the poor in the region.
Different insurance mechanisms have been designed
recently to protect the poor against excessive health
expenditure, including community based health insurance
[18, 19], national health insurance [19–23], and health
insurance for the poorest groups of populations [7]. Mexico
focused on the development of a voluntary insurance tar-
geting the poorest population segments.
Seguro Popular program
The explicit goal of the SP program was to financially
protect the poorest families (within the poorest two income
deciles) that did not have any other socially provided health
insurance coverage. Although enrollment campaigns were
targeted at the poorest sections of the population in rural
and in urban areas, the decision of whether to enrol into SP
was a family’s voluntary choice [7]. The program objec-
tives were to assure:
1. protection of poor families against catastrophic health
expenditures and its impoverishing effect; and
2. universal access to adequate secondary and tertiary
medical care.
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Additionally, on the supply side, all SP-sponsored health
facilities from public health providers had to offer a min-
imum level of health-services quality in order to belong to
the SP-sponsored health facilities network.
The process of health unit accreditation to SP was rolled
out gradually during 2001–2005. Five states (Aguasc-
alientes, Campeche, Colima, Jalisco and Tabasco) were
incorporated into the program in 2001 as part of a pilot
study. An additional 15 states were integrated in the pro-
gram in 2002; 4 more states were incorporated in 2003; and
the remaining states were incorporated during 2004 and
2005. By the end of 2005, all 32 of Mexico’s states had
been incorporated, and approximately 4 million families
(comprising about 12 million individuals) had signed up
for the voluntary program [24].
Medical interventions are offered mainly through the
public health network. The coverage of SP includes a
health services package that covers 250 ailments and the
drugs associated with them (as listed in the CAUSES or
‘‘Universal Catalogue of Health Services’’). Nine types of
group health services are covered: early detection and
prevention; ambulatory medicine; dentistry; reproductive
health; pregnancy, delivery and newborn care; rehabilita-
tion; hospitalization; urgent care and surgery [25]. Affili-
ation to SP does not have restrictions based on current
health status, pre-existing illness, or co-payments accord-
ing to type of health care. SP care is financed primarily by
federal and state governments; most contributions are made
by the federal government, which pays to the different
states a quota per SP-affiliated family.1 However, families
also contribute to the annual payments based on their
ability to pay: families classified into the first two income
deciles are exempted from any annual payment, but those
classified into higher deciles make an annual contribution
that varies from about US$50 to US$770 [27]. A socio-
economic status questionnaire is applied to the head of the
family at the beginning of the process of affiliation in order
to differentiate families according to their income level.
During 2006 and 2007, federal contributions to the SP
represented 75% of total resources, state contributions were
around 24% and family contributions represented only
0.6% of total SP resources. Almost 90% of federal and
state contributions are used to fund provision of health
services listed in the Universal Catalogue of Health Ser-
vices; 8% of the financial protection fund is used to cover
high-cost diseases, and 3% are reserves to finance medical
infrastructure and unplanned medical care. Family contri-
butions are part of the state reserve fund.2
Overall, through the first quarter of 2007, approximately
5.2 million (44%) of the estimated 11.9 million eligible
households nationwide had enrolled in the program [29].
Although indicators of coverage have widely demonstrated
the proven capacity of the SP program to enroll a large
group of uninsured households, there has been limited
evidence for medium-term improvements in the financial
protection of the poorest households.
Analyses of the trends and evolution of catastrophic and
impoverishing health spending have shown a decreased
incidence of catastrophic spending among the poorest
households, but this trend was not clearly found in the case
of OOP expenditures [8]. More recently, using experi-
mental methods, King and colleagues found that SP was
protective against CHE. Their intent to treat (ITT) estimate
reduced CHE by 1.9 percentage points (p.p.) from a
(control group) baseline of 8.4%, thus a reduction of 23%.
Their complier average causal effect (CACE) reduced CHE
by 5.2 p.p. from a baseline of 9.5%, thus a reduction of
55% [6].
A few recent studies have empirically estimated the
effect of health insurance coverage on the incidence of
catastrophic health spending in developing countries using
econometric techniques and observational data [30–32].
This study uses an IV analysis, compares it to the experi-
mental results, and estimates a causal effect of SP on cat-
astrophic and OOP expenditures at the national level.
Data and sample selection
We analyzed the impact of SP on the incidence of CHE and
OOP using two different data sources of household
expenditure and insurance enrolment. We first used data
from the Encuesta de Impacto del Seguro Popular (SP
Impact Evaluation Survey) [33], and then we also used the
Encuesta Nacional de Salud y Nutricio´n (ENSANUT
2005–2006) (National Health and Nutrition Survey) [34].
We selected a specific sample from each of the surveys
as follows. For both surveys, we identified households
where all members were enrolled into SP (‘‘insured’’
group); that is, our ‘‘treatment’’ or ‘‘exposure’’ was that
everyone in the household be officially enrolled into the SP
1 The federal contribution per enrolled family consists of three
components:(1) a quota per family provided by the federal govern-
ment (the so called ‘‘social quota’’) that represents 15% of one
minimum salary; (2) an additional federal contribution (named
‘‘aportacio´n solidaria federal’’) that represents 1.5 times the quota
per family; and (3) a state contribution that represents 0.5 times the
quota per family [26].
2 By law, administrative costs cannot exceed 4% of the total federal
budget transferred to the states for the SP program [28]. Analyzing the
trends in operational costs of the National Commission for Social
Protection in Health (or CNPSS for ‘‘Comisio´n Nacional de
Proteccio´n Social en Salud’’) in the period 2004-2007, those costs
have not exceeded 4% of the total costs of the SP [26]. However, the
administrative costs of managing the funds specifically designed for
catastrophic health spending were not considered.
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program. Then, we created a comparison group of house-
holds with no publicly funded insurance coverage (‘‘unin-
sured’’ group); that is, our controls were households where
no person had any type of health insurance. The idea was to
remain with those families eligible for the SP program
because, by law, families benefiting from other social
insurance are not eligible for the SP program. (In sensi-
tivity analyses, we relaxed the strict criteria for determi-
nation of treatment: we took a household as affiliated into
the program if any member had signed up for the program).
The SP Impact Evaluation Survey is a panel dataset
originally composed of 36,000 dwellings. There was
baseline information (August 2005) for 32,506 dwellings,
and first-wave data collected in mid-2006 with informa-
tion for 29,836 dwellings [6, 35]. The data were collected
in seven states in Mexico (Sonora, San Luis Potosi,
Jalisco, Estado de Mexico, Guerrero, Morelos and Oaxaca).
The main purpose of this survey was to measure
(experimentally) the impact of SP among eligible house-
holds (poor households with no health insurance cover-
age). The criteria used to select the location of the
treatment and control clusters were: (1) to include zones
where the rate of penetration of the program was very
low; (2) to include places where the incorporation of the
SP program was being postponed. Note that this data was
experimental in design; however, we used the follow-up
data only, as if it were a cross-section so that we could
maximize the comparability (external validity of the
method) with the other data source. (Details on the
experimental design have been presented elsewhere [35]).
From the 29,836 households with relevant data (in the
first-wave of data follow-up), we selected the following
analytical samples: 4,033 SP-insured households and
16,759 uninsured households (see Table 1).
The ENSANUT 2006 is a cross-sectional dataset with
nationally representative data, which was collected for
48,304 dwellings [34]. This dataset contains information
about each individual’s health, use of health services,
socio-economic characteristics of households, access to
health programs, and biological health indicators. From the
original sample, we took 45,699 households with health
expenditure data and health insurance data. The analytical
samples included: 4,440 SP-insured households and 16,376
uninsured households. The characteristics for the sample
are summarized in Table 1.
Methods
We undertook several types of analyses. First, we applied
linear models [36, 37] with a basic econometric specifi-
cation to analyze the impact of health insurance on OOP
expenditures:
Yj ¼ Xjb þ Tjd þ ej ð1Þ
Tj ¼ Zjc þ lj ð2Þ
where Y is OOP spending, X the covariate vector, T the
household enrolment into SP, Z the IV (Z , X).
In the naı¨ve models, we assumed exogeneity (i.e., that
the error terms e and l were not correlated), and thus we
could directly estimate Eq. 1 independently of Eq. 2.
However, considering a potentially endogenous treatment
variable, we also used a model with IV with the traditional
two-stage least squares (2SLS) approach [38–40], where e
and l may be correlated. The likelihood of having OOP
health expenditures may be related in a non-random fash-
ion with the probability of having enrolled in SP. House-
holds more prone to have high health care expenditures
(relative to the level of household income), may have more
incentive to sign up for SP.
Second, we defined expenditure as being catastrophic
with a dummy variable equal to unity if household j’s
financial contributions to the health system exceeded 30%
of spending after subsistence needs (US $2 per capita) were
met; and zero otherwise. This type of definition is the most
widely used in the literature [41, 42], but there are other
alternatives [17]. In sensitivity analyses, we changed the
threshold of ‘‘catastrophe’’ to 20% and 40% of total non-
subsistence expenditures. To analyze CHE, we used a
bivariate probit model [38, 40]. The reason for doing this is
that when we analyzed CHE, T and Y are both binary
variables and their error terms might not be independent
[43]. Under this specification, we have:
CHEj ¼ Xjb þ Tjd þ ej
CHEj ¼ 1 if CHEj [ 0
CHEj ¼ 0 otherwise
ð3Þ
Tj ¼ Zjc þ lj
Tj ¼ 1 if Tj [ 0
Tj ¼ 0 otherwise
ð4Þ
Under the naı¨ve probit model assumption, the errors in
Eqs. 3 and 4 are assumed to be uncorrelated. In the
selection correction model, we assumed those errors have a
bivariate normal distribution with a variance normalized to












The correlation between the error terms captures the
likelihood of having CHE and the propensity of enrolling
into SP. A positive correlation coefficient would indicate
that individuals who enroll in SP are more likely to have
CHE. The system is identified if at least one variable in Zj
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is not in Xj. Marginal effects of SP enrollment on the
likelihood of CHE were estimated as the differences
between the two mean CHE outcomes within each sce-
nario: with and without SP.
Third, we also utilized the two-stage residual inclusion
model to analyze CHE [44]. The two-stage residual
inclusion (2SRI) method helps to address endogeneity in
the specific case of a dichotomous endogenous variable
Table 1 Descriptive statistics, with and without Seguro Popular (SP), by data source














CHEa 6.64 (0.39) 9.39 (0.22) 0.0000 4.71 (0.32) 6.67 (0.20) 0.0000
OOPb
Outpatient care 269.9 (18.8) 456.9 (15.6) 0.0000 193.5 (21.91) 393.22 (24.98) 0.0001
Inpatient care 303.3 (40.4) 594.1 (26.3) 0.000 270.82 (62.13) 595.42 (54.11) 0.0029
Medicines 480.5 (21.3) 558.1 (12.3) 0.0033 333.21 (18.02) 528.38 (18.96) 0.0000
Covariates
Characteristics of the household head
Age 46.7 (0.25) 47.6 (0.13) 0.0008 44.66 (0.22) 46.65 (0.12) 0.000
Female-headed 21.7 (0.65) 22.8 (0.33) 0.1249 19.35 (0.59) 21.02 (0.32) 0.0147
Formal education (years) 6.34 (0.72) 6.04 (0.04) 0.0003 5.04 (0.05) 5.71 (0.03) 0.000
Indigenous self-identity 23.28 (0.63) 24.55 (0.33) 0.0825
Speak indigenous language 10.29 (0.45) 12.87 (0.26) 0.000
Characteristics of the household
Asset index -0.25 (0.01) -0.08 (0.006) 0.0000 -0.50 (0.01) -0.29 (0.01) 0.000
Children B 1 11.85 (0.51) 15.16 (0.27) 0.0000 14.08 (0.52) 15.41 (0.28) 0.0282
Children B 7 49.61 (0.79) 47.04 (0.39) 0.0034 54.05 (0.75) 46.98 (0.39) 0.000
Adults C 65 19.24 (0.62) 20.95 (0.32) 0.0206 15.54 (0.54) 18.73 (0.30) 0.000
Someone with diabetes 3.83 (0.29) 3.52 (0.14) 0.322
Someone with hypertension 7.72 (0.40) 6.19 (0.18) 0.0002
Someone with gastritis 6.31 (0.36) 5.33 (0.17) 0.0117
Household size (# of persons) 4.30 (0.32) 4.42 (0.02) 0.0012 4.41 (0.03) 4.37 (0.02) 0.2863
Enrolled in oportunidades 67.39 (0.74) 38.79 (0.38) 0.0000 19.91 (0.60) 11.16 (0.24) 0.000
Characteristics of the locality
Rural area 97.21 (0.26) 92.6 (0.20) 0.0000 52.93 (0.74) 34.42 (0.37) 0.000
Deprivation index -0.03 (0.01) -0.35 (0.01) 0.0000 -0.60 (0.01) -0.76 (0.01) 0.000
Instrumental variables
Locality SP coverage 28.74 (0.39) 10.24 (0.13) 0.0000 39.93 (0.39) 11.36 (0.13) 0.000
Randomized to treatment 87.55 (0.52) 32.90 (0.36) 0.0000
Incorporated by 2001 0.34 (0.07) 0.63 (0.06) 0.0304 28.16 (0.68) 8.67 (0.22) 0.000
Incorporated by 2002 67.51 (0.71) 57.52 (0.39) 0.000
Incorporated by 2003 79.36 (0.61) 77.40 (0.33) 0.0070
Incorporated by 2004 95.10 (0.33) 91.11 (0.22) 0.000
In households with SP, all members report to have enrolled into the voluntary health insurance program, whereas in households without SP, all
members report not having any type of publicly funded health insurance. Standard error in parentheses
ENSANUT Encuesta Nacional de Salud y Nutricio´n (National Health and Nutrition Survey), CHE Catastrophic health expenditures, OOP Out-
of-pocket expenditures
Authors’ calculations based on ENSANUT [34], SP Impact Evaluation Survey [33], Census data [52], and SP evaluation data [24]
a CHE = 1 if a household’s financial contributions to the health system exceed 30% of income remaining after subsistence needs (US$2 per
capita) have been met; and CHE = 0 otherwise
b Annualized OOP spending measured in Mexican pesos of 2006
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with a dichotomous outcome variable. This method is the
preferred option over the two-stage predictor substitution
(2SPS), which mimics 2SLS for continuous variables.
Under this econometric model, the first stage proceeded
running a non-linear regression of the treatment on the
covariate vector and the instruments. Then, the residuals
from the first-stage regression were incorporated into a
non-linear regression of the outcome on the covariate
vector, the (endogenous) treatment, and the residuals.
To select an appropriate covariate vector we searched
the literature [17, 45, 46] and found the main determinants
of CHE to be poverty, aging, chronic illnesses, low levels
of insurance coverage, urban/rural differences, socio-eco-
nomic status, types of illness, demographic composition of
the household, and characteristics of the household head
(age, sex, education). Health spending would be affected
by the family’s wealth/physical assets, and its income or
financial assets as well as their insurance coverage. We
used an asset index as a proxy for household wealth [47].
Additionally, the deprivation index at the municipality/
locality level helped to control for general levels of well-
being at the local level [48]. Econometric methods to
reduce selection bias have been used in several related
studies [30, 31, 49, 50].
The main explanatory or ‘‘treatment’’ variable (T) to be
analyzed was enrolment into SP, a public insurance scheme
for the poor and otherwise uncovered population in Mexico.
Enrolment into SP would be determined by Eq. 2 above,
which has a set of instrumental variables (Z) that includes
the same covariate vector X as in Eq. 1. The set of
‘‘instruments’’ would strongly affect the probability of a
household being part of the SP program, but they would not
be correlated with the outcome of interest (catastrophic
expenditures in health) through channels other than the
enrolment into SP.
The instrumental variables took advantage of the fact
that SP was implemented gradually across the different 32
Mexican states. First, we used the year of incorporation as
a proxy for the length of time that a particular state had SP.
For example, if a state was incorporated by 2003, a dummy
variable for 2001 would be zero, a dummy for 2002 would
also be zero, but the dummy variables for 2003 and 2004
would be equal to one. By 2005, all states were incorpo-
rated, so that 2005 serves as the reference year in the
ENSANUT. Given that the states included in the sample
were all incorporated by 2002, in the SP Impact Evaluation
Survey the reference year was 2002. The marginal effect of
the incorporation dummy measures the effect on the
household SP enrolment probability of incorporation a year
earlier. This instrument was implemented successfully in a
similar context in Mexico [51].
Second, similar to the first set of instrumental variables,
we used the level of penetration of the program at the
locality level to help us determine the probability of
enrolment. The logic was that households living in locali-
ties with higher SP penetration or coverage had higher
probabilities of enrolling into the program. We constructed
the variable with a ratio of SP enrolled households over
eligible (uninsured households) at the locality level using
the latest round of Census data [52]. Households located in
areas where the level of diffusion of SP was higher tended
to have higher probability of being enrolled into the SP
program. We saw this instrumental variable as an aggregate
continuous proxy for program participation at the house-
hold level. We assumed that the level of program diffusion
or penetration had a direct impact on the behavioral choi-
ces of households; but with no underlying aggregate effect
over expenditures, other than through the channel of
insurance choice [53–55]. A similar identification method
was used in an application to correct for insurance self-
selection in Ecuador [56].
The geographic and temporal variations in incorporation
and coverage rates helped us to identify SP household
enrolment, independently of the outcomes of interest. Thus,
the year-of-incorporation dummies, as well as SP coverage
rates (as a continuous variable: 0–100%), were excluded
from Eqs. 1 and 3.
In addition to estimating the impact of SP on CHE, we
also used the same (linear) econometric framework to
estimate the effect of SP on OOP expenditures. We utilized
the annualized OOP spending (in pesos of 2006). In sen-
sitivity analyses we also used binary indicators of OOP
spending, i.e., any positive expenditure related to outpa-
tient care, inpatient care, and medicines, respectively.
For all model specifications, we compared the results
from ‘‘naı¨ve’’ estimates where the choice of health insurance
use was assumed to be exogenous, to the results we obtained
using models with instrumental variables. All analyses were
conducted using STATATM [57], including procedures
based on: reg, ivreg2, probit, biprobit, and mfx [58].
Results
Sample characteristics
Table 1 shows the outcomes and covariates for the two
datasets. The main outcome was CHE. In the SP Impact
Evaluation Survey, 6.64% of SP insured households and
9.39% of uninsured experienced CHE. In the ENSANUT,
4.71% of insured and 6.67% of uninsured households
exhibited CHE (i.e., health expenditures over 30% of total
household expenditures after accounting for subsistence
needs, or US$2 per day).
In terms of OOP expenditures, the SP Impact Evaluation
Survey showed an average annualized outpatient care
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expenditure of $270 (Mexican pesos of 2006) for SP
affiliated households versus $457 for non-insured; at the
national level, the ENSANUT showed $193 for the insured,
and $393 for the uninsured. For inpatient care, the insured
population in the SP Impact Evaluation Survey spent
$303 pesos, and the uninsured spent $594 pesos; while the
national average in the ENSANUT was $271 pesos for the
insured and $595 for the uninsured. Furthermore, the SP
Impact Evaluation Survey population spent $481 on med-
icines per year if insured and $558 if they were uninsured;
meanwhile the ENSANUT showed that the SP insured
population spent $332 in medicines, while the uninsured
spent $528 pesos per year. All the differences between
insured and uninsured populations were significant in both
surveys.
In terms of the covariates, the characteristics of the
household-head included: age, female-headed, formal
education, indigenous self-identity, speak indigenous lan-
guage. For both uninsured and insured groups, the mean of
the age of the household-head fluctuated between 45 and
48 years. The percentage of households that were female-
headed was between 19 and 23%. The number of years of
formal education for the household head was between 5
and 6.3 years. ENSANUT data also showed that almost a
quarter of the household heads consider themselves
indigenous, and over 10% of them speak an indigenous
language (other than Spanish).
Characteristics of the household included: the household
asset index as a proxy of family income, household size,
and benefits from other social programs (in particular the
OPORTUNIDADES program). At this level, variables that
denoted the composition of the family were: children who
were 1 year old or younger, and children who were 7 years
old or younger, as well as adults 65 years old or older. For
the specific case of ENSANUT we included additional
variables that informed us about the presence of some
chronic health conditions among at least one of the mem-
bers of the family (diabetes, hypertension and gastritis).
SP-insured were more likely to have been diagnosed with
diabetes. The mean for the household asset index was
lower (or more negative) for both the SP-insured and
uninsured populations, indicating lower levels of family
wealth. The mean household size was about four members.
Moreover, about one-half of the households have children
7 years of age and younger; and about one-fifth of house-
holds had adults 65 years or older.
Comparing insured and uninsured, we found differences
in the percentage of families who reported to be benefi-
ciaries of the OPORTUNIDADES program. Also, a con-
siderably lower percentage of families from the ENSANUT
survey reported to be benefiting from this program than
in the other survey. Generally, for both data sources,
SP-insured households were more likely to be benefited
by OPORTUNIDADES. This result was consistent with
the enrollment rules of SP that explicitly established
OPORTUNIDADES families as a priority group.
At locality level, we incorporated variables that descri-
bed the rural or urban condition of the municipalities and
the deprivation index [48]. While the SP Impact Evaluation
Survey (which was not nationally representative) showed
96% of the insured, and about 89% of uninsured, living in
rural areas, there were 53% of SP insured households, and
Table 2 SP Impact Survey: naive and instrumental variables (IV) models for effect of SP on CHEa and OOPb health expenditures control for all
covariates in Table 1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. OLS ordinary least squares, 2SLS two-stage least squares, 2SRI two-stage residual




OLS -195.2*** (34.4) -261.2*** (60.3) -71.0** (28.2)
Probit (ME) -0.030** (0.004)
IV estimatesd
2SLS -447.1*** (71.8) -450.3*** (125.2) -110.9* (58.9)
Bivariate Probit (ME) -0.046** (0.007)
Correlation coefficient (q) 0.109** (0.042)
2SRI (ME) -0.047** (0.007)
Residuals (ME) 0.031** (0.008)
* Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%
a CHE defined as OOP spending greater than 30% of survival consumption (over US$2 per day)
b Annualized OOP spending measured in Mexican pesos of 2006
c Naive models assume exogeneity of the treatment variable
d IV models deal with endogeneity of selection into SP
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34% of the uninsured living in rural localities reported in
the ENSANUT.
Instrumental variables applied in the experimental
dataset
Table 2 presents the naı¨ve and selectivity-corrected models
using the SP Impact Evaluation Survey. The naı¨ve effect of
SP on OOP spending (which corresponds to Eq. 1 esti-
mated independently) was a reduction of $195 in outpatient
care, $261 in inpatient care, and $71 in medicines (in pesos
per year). In the naı¨ve probit model (corresponding to
Eq. 3 independently), there was a protective effect of SP on
CHE of 3.0 p.p. The effect of SP on OOP expenditures was
more protective in the IV estimation (Eqs. 1, 2 estimated
together): outpatient expenses decreased by $447; hospi-
talization by $450; and medicines by $111 pesos per year.
The protective effect of SP on CHE increased to 4.6 p.p. in
the bivariate probit model (Eqs. 3, 4 jointly); and to
4.7 p.p. in the 2SRI model.
Instrumental variables in the nationally representative
dataset
Table 3 reports the summary of naı¨ve and instrumental
variables models of the effect of SP on CHE and OOP
spending for the National Health and Nutrition Survey
(ENSANUT 2006). The naı¨ve probit estimate of the effect
of SP on CHE was protective: a household was 2.0 p.p. less
likely to suffer CHE if enrolled in SP. Similarly, SP was
protective of all OOP spending: per year, SP households
spent $153 pesos less than uninsured households in out-
patient services, $236 less in hospitalizations, and $139
less in medicines when compared to the uninsured. Cor-
recting for endogeneity, the impact of SP on CHE and OOP
spending was generally more protective. The bivariate
probit model estimates showed a protective effect of SP on
CHE of 3.6 p.p.; the 2SRI model estimated a similar pro-
tective effect of 3.7 p.p. With regard to OOP expenditures,
IV correction showed that SP insured households spent
$171 less on outpatient services, and $360 less on medi-
cines. Nevertheless, the effect of SP on hospitalization
expenditures was not significant.
In both datasets (Tables 2, 3), the coefficients of corre-
lation (q) in the bivariate probit models were positive and
significant. Likewise, the coefficients for the first-stage
residuals were also positive and significant in the outcome
equations under the 2SRI models. These results support the
hypothesis of selectivity in the enrollment into SP.
Sensitivity analyses
When we utilized a more relaxed definition of SP enroll-
ment (if any member of the household had signed up for
the program), we also found protective effects on CHE and
OOP spending; some of the results were of lesser magni-
tude, but still significant. Similarly, when we modified the
threshold for the definition of ‘‘catastrophic’’ to 20% and
40% of total household expenditures after accounting for
subsistence needs, we also found protective effects of SP;
again, the results changed in magnitude, but they remained
protective and statistically significant.
Other analyses included using the log transformation of
OOP expenditures, OOP spending as a dichotomous vari-
able (yes/no), as well as the supply side factors (availability
of health clinics, doctors and nurses) at the municipality




OLS -152.6*** (29.1) -235.5*** (81.9) -139.0*** (22.7)
Probit (ME) -0.020*** (0.004)
IV estimatesd
2SLS -171.0*** (64.1) -175.3 (182.0) -360.0*** (54.9)
Bivariate Probit (ME) -0.036*** (0.006)
Correlation coefficient (q) 0.146*** (0.045)
2SRI (ME) -0.037*** (0.006)
Residuals (ME) 0.031*** (0.009)
* Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%
a CHE defined as OOP spending greater than 30% of survival consumption (over US$2 per day)
b Annualized OOP spending measured in Mexican pesos of 2006
c Naive models assume exogeneity of the treatment variable
d IV models deal with endogeneity of selection into SP
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level. These analyses supported the overall conclusions of
the paper. However, the supply side factor data reduced the
sample size considerably, thus not allowing for full
implementation of the models.
Finally, we ran regression models with and without
taking advantage of the randomized assignment to treat-
ment as an instrument [59, 60], and also as a covariate to
control for non-compliance in the models using the SP
Impact Evaluation Survey. The results presented in the
tables are the best fitting models; however, making these
changes did not qualitatively change the conclusions of the
main results.
Discussion
The proposed IV models perform well when compared
against the ‘‘gold standard’’ results obtained in the exper-
imental setting. This paper’s results on the effect of SP
program participation on CHE are generally comparable to
those found through a randomized controlled evaluation
[35, 61]. King and colleagues found that SP reduces the
probability of incurring CHE by 23% with ITT analysis
and by 55% using the CACE. Using IV methods in the
(follow-up) experimental survey, we find a protective
effect of 49%.
Applying the IV method at the national level, using
ENSANUT, we find a protective effect of 54% for the
country as a whole. Hence, the selectivity-corrected,
nationally representative results seem to suggest that SP
has a protective effect for the entire country, not only in the
pilot experimental areas.
On the other hand, there are some important differences
between the experimental results [6]. The experiment did
not find a protective effect of SP on medicine expenditures
in the SP Evaluation Survey; however, using the alternative
IV method we do find an important protective effect.
Although the IV method using ENSANUT also found
decreases in outpatient and medicine expenditures at the
national level, it did not find significant effects in inpatient
expenditures (and this result was the same using alternative
definitions of SP enrollment at the household level, alter-
native sets of covariates and alternative sets of instrumental
variables).
A major problem in Latin America, and other regions
with low- and middle-income countries, is the high per-
centage of households that must incur in out-of-pocket
health care expenditures. This form of financing fre-
quently involves CHE, particularly among households
within the first two deciles of income, or those living in
poverty [16]. A multi-country analysis has shown that a
group of countries in Latin America have some of the
highest rates of CHE [17], confirming the lack of
financial protection among the poor in the region. The
results in our paper show the protective effect of health
insurance for the poor.
Limitations and conclusions
The results in this paper show that the popular insurance
system for the poor in Mexico has a protective effect on
excessive health expenditures, and on most OOP health-
related expenditures for the Mexican population.
The paper has some limitations. The definition of
CHE does not consider all those households that post-
pone their health care for the lack of financial resources.
That is, it does not address the issue of selection into
CHE. Health expenditure is, by definition, conditional on
utilization. Thus, there is another possible econometric
specification to take into account the endogeneity gen-
erated by health seeking behavior. Such correction would
require health status, clinical and outcomes data on non-
users to exogenously assess needed medical expenditures
[62, 63].
Moreover, the present analysis does not include alter-
native indicators that can also describe the effect of the
incidence of health expenditures on the household’s
financial status, such as impoverishing expenditures
(spending that moves the household’s economic status
below the poverty line).
At the household level, the cross-sectional surveys do
not provide information about the length of exposure to the
program (i.e., how long the households have been enrolled
in SP) or about the quality of the services offered, both of
which could have an important effect on health
expenditures.
In spite of the shortcomings, this paper presents a rea-
sonable IV approach showing a robust protective effect of
SP on CHE and on most OOP health expenditures. The
impact of SP on the reduction of CHE was significant using
the SP Impact Evaluation Survey; thus, replicating, and
‘‘validating’’ the IV method. We also found protective
results with the ENSANUT using a nationally representa-
tive sample. The SP reduced expenditures in outpatient
care as well as expenditures on medicines.
This paper provides the first selectivity-corrected evi-
dence that the universal health insurance program for the
poor in Mexico—Seguro Popular—has a protective effect
on both catastrophic and out-of-pocket health expenditures
not only at the limited localities included in the experi-
mental evaluation, but at the national level. The lessons
from Mexico may be of relevance to other low- and mid-
dle-income countries around the world trying to financially
protect the poorest segments of society against excessive
health spending.
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